Dynamic Intrahousehold Bargaining, Matrimonial Property Law, and Suicide in Canada

Economists who analyze household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally assumed that the household acts as a single unit. They assume that there exists one decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of household welfare and that all household resources are effectively pooled. This approach...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Adam, Christopher, Hoddinott, John F., Ligon, Ethan
Formato: Capítulo de libro
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: International Food Policy Research Institute 2003
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/157500

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