Cover Image
QR Code

Dynamic Intrahousehold Bargaining, Matrimonial Property Law, and Suicide in Canada

Economists who analyze household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally assumed that the household acts as a single unit. They assume that there exists one decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of household welfare and that all household resources are effectively pooled. This approach...

Full description

Main Authors: Adam, Christopher, Hoddinott, John F., Ligon, Ethan
Format: Book Chapter
Language:Inglés
Published: International Food Policy Research Institute 2003
Subjects:
property
women
gender
developing countries
economic theories
household budget
household consumption
nutrition
farming systems
legal system
policies
education
health
empowerment
agricultural technology
agricultural growth
child care
property rights
natural resources management
agricultural policies
technology transfer
drought
vegetables
fisheries
children
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/157500
Summary:Economists who analyze household decisionmaking allocation have traditionally assumed that the household acts as a single unit. They assume that there exists one decisionmaker whose preferences form the basis of household welfare and that all household resources are effectively pooled. This approach is known as the “unitary model,” the “common preference model,” or the “joint family utility model,” depending on the study consulted.

Similar Items