Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach
The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following que...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Capítulo de libro |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148639 |
| _version_ | 1855541740301189120 |
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| author | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David |
| author_browse | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David |
| author_facet | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David |
| author_sort | Bouët, Antoine |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following questions: Which countries are preventing the achievement of an agreement, and why? Is there any way to change the negotiation rules to achieve a pro-liberalization outcome? How can we explain the creation of coalitions, and do they thwart the success of the negotiations? |
| format | Book Chapter |
| id | CGSpace148639 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateRange | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1486392025-11-06T04:18:23Z Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David models economic development computable general equilibrium models trade agricultural development The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following questions: Which countries are preventing the achievement of an agreement, and why? Is there any way to change the negotiation rules to achieve a pro-liberalization outcome? How can we explain the creation of coalitions, and do they thwart the success of the negotiations? 2017 2024-06-21T09:25:18Z 2024-06-21T09:25:18Z Book Chapter https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148639 en https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896292499 https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745609990267 Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Bouët, Antoine; and Laborde Debucquet, David. 2017. Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach. In Agriculture, development, and the global trading system: 2000– 2015. Chapter 3. Pp 71-102. Bouët, Antoine; and Laborde Debucquet, David (Eds.). Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://doi.org/10.2499/9780896292499_03. |
| spellingShingle | models economic development computable general equilibrium models trade agricultural development Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title | Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_full | Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_fullStr | Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_short | Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_sort | why is the doha development agenda failing and what can be done a computable general equilibrium game theoretical approach |
| topic | models economic development computable general equilibrium models trade agricultural development |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148639 |
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