Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach
The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following que...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Capítulo de libro |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2017
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148639 |
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