Why is the Doha Development agenda failing? And what can be done? A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach
The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following que...
| Autores principales: | , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Capítulo de libro |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148639 |
| Sumario: | The objective of this chapter is to provide a strategic analysis of these negotiations. In particular, we examine whether these trade negotiations can reach a pro-liberalization outcome, and if so, which packages may be approved. If no pro-liberalization outcome is possible, we ask the following questions: Which countries are preventing the achievement of an agreement, and why? Is there any way to change the negotiation rules to achieve a pro-liberalization outcome? How can we explain the creation of coalitions, and do they thwart the success of the negotiations? |
|---|