Water management reform and the choice of contractual form in China
This paper explains the puzzling fact that in organizing the management of surface water, village leaders have provided incentives to canal managers in some areas, but not in all. Our study indicates that the optimal contractual choice depends on the relative abilities of the leader and the manager,...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2008
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162338 |
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