Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach
We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000 |
| _version_ | 1855530812891463680 |
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| author | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David |
| author_browse | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David |
| author_facet | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David |
| author_sort | Bouët, Antoine |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments’ objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace162000 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateRange | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1620002025-11-06T06:47:10Z Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David trade agreements computable general equilibrium models cooperative activities globalization markets international agreements We herein use a world Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model to simulate 143 potential trade reforms and seek solutions to the issues hampering progress in the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). Inside the domain defined by all these possible outcomes, we apply the axiomatic theory of bargaining and select the Nash solution of cooperative games. The solutions vary according to the objective functions adopted by the trade negotiators. When real income is the objective and services are excluded, or when optimizing terms of trade is the objective, the Nash solution is the status quo. Trade liberalization is feasible only when the negotiators focus on national exports or Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Our assessment of some possible solutions reveals that excluding members having a GDP below a certain threshold improves the bargaining process, regardless of the governments’ objective. Formation of coalition, such as the G20, constitutes an option for its members to block outcomes imposed by rich members. We also find that side payments may be a solution, but represent a very high share of the global income gain. 2009 2024-11-21T10:00:18Z 2024-11-21T10:00:18Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Bouët, Antoine; Laborde Debucquet, David. 2009. Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done? IFPRI Discussion Paper 877. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000 |
| spellingShingle | trade agreements computable general equilibrium models cooperative activities globalization markets international agreements Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title | Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_full | Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_fullStr | Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_short | Why is the Doha development agenda failing? And what can be done?: A computable general equilibrium-game theoretical approach |
| title_sort | why is the doha development agenda failing and what can be done a computable general equilibrium game theoretical approach |
| topic | trade agreements computable general equilibrium models cooperative activities globalization markets international agreements |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000 |
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