How important are peer effects in group lending?: Estimating a static game of incomplete information
We quantify the importance of peer effects in group lending by estimating a static game of incomplete information. In our model, group members make their repayment decisions simultaneously based on their household and loan characteristics as well as their expectations of other members’ repayment dec...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161876 |
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