Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana
Analyses of how coveted central-government resources in Africa are shared have shown widespread patronage, ethnic cronyism, and pork-barrel politics. While some governments have attempted to rectify the situation by establishing revenue-sharing formulas, a key unanswered question is whether such ins...
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
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International Food Policy Research Institute
2009
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161849 |
| _version_ | 1855519957504229376 |
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| author | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| author_browse | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| author_facet | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| author_sort | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Analyses of how coveted central-government resources in Africa are shared have shown widespread patronage, ethnic cronyism, and pork-barrel politics. While some governments have attempted to rectify the situation by establishing revenue-sharing formulas, a key unanswered question is whether such institutions are able to achieve this goal. This paper presents an empirical investigation of a pioneering formula-based system of resource allocation from the central government to local governments in Ghana?the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). The evidence is consistent with governments being able to politically manipulate resource allocation within the confines of the formula-based system. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that the DACF completely fails to limit political influence. It indicates that other guiding structures of a formula-based system?in particular, how and when the formula can be altered?are important determinants of how well a program such as the DACF is able to resist political pressures. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace161849 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publishDateRange | 2009 |
| publishDateSort | 2009 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1618492025-11-06T05:42:44Z Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana Banful, Afua Branoah resource allocation governance Analyses of how coveted central-government resources in Africa are shared have shown widespread patronage, ethnic cronyism, and pork-barrel politics. While some governments have attempted to rectify the situation by establishing revenue-sharing formulas, a key unanswered question is whether such institutions are able to achieve this goal. This paper presents an empirical investigation of a pioneering formula-based system of resource allocation from the central government to local governments in Ghana?the District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF). The evidence is consistent with governments being able to politically manipulate resource allocation within the confines of the formula-based system. Nevertheless, this does not suggest that the DACF completely fails to limit political influence. It indicates that other guiding structures of a formula-based system?in particular, how and when the formula can be altered?are important determinants of how well a program such as the DACF is able to resist political pressures. 2009 2024-11-21T09:58:47Z 2024-11-21T09:58:47Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161849 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Banful, Afua Branoah. 2009. Do institutions limit clientelism? IFPRI Discussion Paper 855. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161849 |
| spellingShingle | resource allocation governance Banful, Afua Branoah Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana |
| title | Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana |
| title_full | Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana |
| title_fullStr | Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana |
| title_short | Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana |
| title_sort | do institutions limit clientelism a study of the district assemblies common fund in ghana |
| topic | resource allocation governance |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161849 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT banfulafuabranoah doinstitutionslimitclientelismastudyofthedistrictassembliescommonfundinghana |