Do institutions limit clientelism?: A study of the district assemblies common fund in Ghana
Analyses of how coveted central-government resources in Africa are shared have shown widespread patronage, ethnic cronyism, and pork-barrel politics. While some governments have attempted to rectify the situation by establishing revenue-sharing formulas, a key unanswered question is whether such ins...
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2009
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161849 |
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