Testing Nash-bargaining household models with time-series data
This paper uses a “natural experiment” in Canadian divorce law reform to discriminate empirically between unitary and Nash-bargained models of the household. Using time-series data from three Canadian provinces, it demonstrates that following landmark divorce law reforms in the 1970s—reforms that le...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
1998
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161254 |
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