Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana
Theories of fiscal federalism imply that determining intergovernmental transfers based on the political incentives results in inefficient allocation of resources across geographic regions. Such practices also can result in tensions between classes, and ethnic and religious groups, which are concentr...
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| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | Inglés |
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International Food Policy Research Institute
2010
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154273 |
| _version_ | 1855541662624776192 |
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| author | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| author_browse | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| author_facet | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| author_sort | Banful, Afua Branoah |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Theories of fiscal federalism imply that determining intergovernmental transfers based on the political incentives results in inefficient allocation of resources across geographic regions. Such practices also can result in tensions between classes, and ethnic and religious groups, which are concentrated in distinct geographical areas. Nevertheless, empirical evidence consistently confirms that the practice of allocating government resources based on political relationships continues to be pervasive around the world. This brief summarizes the results of an IFPRI study in Ghana assessing the effectiveness of formulas as a strategy to limit political motivation behind resource sharing. |
| format | Brief |
| id | CGSpace154273 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publishDateRange | 2010 |
| publishDateSort | 2010 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1542732025-11-06T07:42:00Z Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana Banful, Afua Branoah federalism governance Theories of fiscal federalism imply that determining intergovernmental transfers based on the political incentives results in inefficient allocation of resources across geographic regions. Such practices also can result in tensions between classes, and ethnic and religious groups, which are concentrated in distinct geographical areas. Nevertheless, empirical evidence consistently confirms that the practice of allocating government resources based on political relationships continues to be pervasive around the world. This brief summarizes the results of an IFPRI study in Ghana assessing the effectiveness of formulas as a strategy to limit political motivation behind resource sharing. 2010 2024-10-01T14:00:34Z 2024-10-01T14:00:34Z Brief https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154273 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Banful, Afua Branoah. 2010. Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana. GSSP Policy Note 1. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154273 |
| spellingShingle | federalism governance Banful, Afua Branoah Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana |
| title | Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana |
| title_full | Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana |
| title_fullStr | Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana |
| title_short | Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana |
| title_sort | do formula based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting evidence from ghana |
| topic | federalism governance |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154273 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT banfulafuabranoah doformulabasedintergovernmentaltransfermechanismseliminatepoliticallymotivatedtargetingevidencefromghana |