Do formula-based intergovernmental transfer mechanisms eliminate politically motivated targeting? Evidence from Ghana
Theories of fiscal federalism imply that determining intergovernmental transfers based on the political incentives results in inefficient allocation of resources across geographic regions. Such practices also can result in tensions between classes, and ethnic and religious groups, which are concentr...
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| Formato: | Brief |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2010
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| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154273 |
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