The value of delegated quality control
This paper studies the case in which a firm delegates quality control to an independent monitor. In a repeated game, consumers’ trust provides incentives to acquire information about whether the good is defective, and withhold defective goods from sale. If third‐party reports are observable to consu...
| Autor principal: | |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Wiley
2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148506 |
Ejemplares similares: The value of delegated quality control
- Delegation of quality control in value chains
- The value of delegated quality control and market size with an application to Kyrgyzstan dairy
- Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
- Value of quality controlled citizen science data for rainfall-runoff characterization in a rapidly urbanizing catchment
- Quality control and the marketing of non-staple food in India
- The Practice of Delegation