Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types
There has been some recognition in the development community that building technical capacity of public service providers and increasing resources is not enough to bring about development outcomes. Researchers and practitioners are increasingly appreciating that accounting for the stated needs of co...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147884 |
| _version_ | 1855533403715141632 |
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| author | Mogues, Tewodaj Erman, Alvina |
| author_browse | Erman, Alvina Mogues, Tewodaj |
| author_facet | Mogues, Tewodaj Erman, Alvina |
| author_sort | Mogues, Tewodaj |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | There has been some recognition in the development community that building technical capacity of public service providers and increasing resources is not enough to bring about development outcomes. Researchers and practitioners are increasingly appreciating that accounting for the stated needs of communities supports the process of pro-poor public resource allocation. We examine four institutional arrangements that explicitly endeavor to make public spending responsive to the needs of the poor by moving decision-making procedures closer to the population—participatory budgeting, community-driven development (CDD) programs, decentralization, and delegated targeting of transfers. Using the existing literature, we compare experiences across the four arrangements and countries. Regarding responsiveness to needs of the poor, evidence is cautiously optimistic for participatory budgeting, CDD, and decentralization. As for delegating the targeting of transfers to subnational authorities and communities, evidence suggests that the effect may be regressive. However, there are important mediating effects of public spending responsiveness under the various institutional arrangements. Local elite capture is a key factor dampening pro-poor spending where either exogenous circumstances such as prevailing inequality, or inadequate program design, enable capture to materialize. Politics is an important determinant of the success of these arrangements. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace147884 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateRange | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1478842025-11-06T07:03:58Z Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types Mogues, Tewodaj Erman, Alvina community development rural communities poverty alleviation household expenditure households decentralization budgets poverty public expenditure There has been some recognition in the development community that building technical capacity of public service providers and increasing resources is not enough to bring about development outcomes. Researchers and practitioners are increasingly appreciating that accounting for the stated needs of communities supports the process of pro-poor public resource allocation. We examine four institutional arrangements that explicitly endeavor to make public spending responsive to the needs of the poor by moving decision-making procedures closer to the population—participatory budgeting, community-driven development (CDD) programs, decentralization, and delegated targeting of transfers. Using the existing literature, we compare experiences across the four arrangements and countries. Regarding responsiveness to needs of the poor, evidence is cautiously optimistic for participatory budgeting, CDD, and decentralization. As for delegating the targeting of transfers to subnational authorities and communities, evidence suggests that the effect may be regressive. However, there are important mediating effects of public spending responsiveness under the various institutional arrangements. Local elite capture is a key factor dampening pro-poor spending where either exogenous circumstances such as prevailing inequality, or inadequate program design, enable capture to materialize. Politics is an important determinant of the success of these arrangements. 2016-04-06 2024-06-21T09:23:27Z 2024-06-21T09:23:27Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147884 en https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150395 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150109 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150071 https://doi.org/10.1111/saje.12076 https://cn.ifpri.org/archives/4614 Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Mogues, Tewodaj and Erman, Alvina. 2016. Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1519. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147884 |
| spellingShingle | community development rural communities poverty alleviation household expenditure households decentralization budgets poverty public expenditure Mogues, Tewodaj Erman, Alvina Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| title | Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| title_full | Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| title_fullStr | Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| title_full_unstemmed | Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| title_short | Institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor—(where) have they worked? Review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| title_sort | institutional arrangements to make public spending responsive to the poor where have they worked review of the evidence on four major intervention types |
| topic | community development rural communities poverty alleviation household expenditure households decentralization budgets poverty public expenditure |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147884 |
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