Cooperation in polygynous households
Evidence that monogamous spouses often compromise household gains to maintain individual control over resources has informed the design of cash transfer schemes and other poverty alleviation programs. In polygynous households, decision making may be even less cooperative as co-wife conflict is commo...
| Main Authors: | , , , , |
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147412 |
| _version_ | 1855523292997222400 |
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| author | Barr, Abigail Dekker, Marleen Janssens, Wendy Kebede, Bereket Kramer, Berber |
| author_browse | Barr, Abigail Dekker, Marleen Janssens, Wendy Kebede, Bereket Kramer, Berber |
| author_facet | Barr, Abigail Dekker, Marleen Janssens, Wendy Kebede, Bereket Kramer, Berber |
| author_sort | Barr, Abigail |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Evidence that monogamous spouses often compromise household gains to maintain individual control over resources has informed the design of cash transfer schemes and other poverty alleviation programs. In polygynous households, decision making may be even less cooperative as co-wife conflict is common and welfare outcomes are often worse than in monogamous households, despite polygyny being associated with better ex ante prospects. Using a carefully designed series of two-person public goods games, we conduct a quantitative, ceteris paribus comparison of willingness to cooperate to maximize household gains across the two household types. We find that polygynous spouses and co-wives are less cooperative, one with another, than monogamous spouses. Co-wives are least cooperative toward each other and polygynous husbands are less cooperative with each of their wives than monogamous husbands are with their one wife. Finally, there are differences across the household types in the way husbands and wives condition their cooperativeness on how much they believe their spouses and co-wives will cooperate. Specifically, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and apparently less altruistic than in monogamous households. This has implications for the design of poverty alleviation programs that transfer resources either in cash or in-kind. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace147412 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateRange | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1474122025-11-06T06:01:16Z Cooperation in polygynous households Barr, Abigail Dekker, Marleen Janssens, Wendy Kebede, Bereket Kramer, Berber gender sociology households cooperative activities resource allocation marriage decision making poverty women Evidence that monogamous spouses often compromise household gains to maintain individual control over resources has informed the design of cash transfer schemes and other poverty alleviation programs. In polygynous households, decision making may be even less cooperative as co-wife conflict is common and welfare outcomes are often worse than in monogamous households, despite polygyny being associated with better ex ante prospects. Using a carefully designed series of two-person public goods games, we conduct a quantitative, ceteris paribus comparison of willingness to cooperate to maximize household gains across the two household types. We find that polygynous spouses and co-wives are less cooperative, one with another, than monogamous spouses. Co-wives are least cooperative toward each other and polygynous husbands are less cooperative with each of their wives than monogamous husbands are with their one wife. Finally, there are differences across the household types in the way husbands and wives condition their cooperativeness on how much they believe their spouses and co-wives will cooperate. Specifically, behavior in polygynous households is more reciprocal and apparently less altruistic than in monogamous households. This has implications for the design of poverty alleviation programs that transfer resources either in cash or in-kind. 2017 2024-06-21T09:22:49Z 2024-06-21T09:22:49Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147412 en https://doi.org/10.2499/capriwp117 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150365 http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/464231468779449856/Targeting-of-transfers-in-developing-countries-review-of-lessons-and-experience https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161219 Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Barr, Abigail; Dekker, Marleen; Janssens, Wendy; Kebede, Bereket; and Kramer, Berber. 2017. Cooperation in polygynous households. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1625. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147412 |
| spellingShingle | gender sociology households cooperative activities resource allocation marriage decision making poverty women Barr, Abigail Dekker, Marleen Janssens, Wendy Kebede, Bereket Kramer, Berber Cooperation in polygynous households |
| title | Cooperation in polygynous households |
| title_full | Cooperation in polygynous households |
| title_fullStr | Cooperation in polygynous households |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperation in polygynous households |
| title_short | Cooperation in polygynous households |
| title_sort | cooperation in polygynous households |
| topic | gender sociology households cooperative activities resource allocation marriage decision making poverty women |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147412 |
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