From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, cau...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Royal Economic Society
2021
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142494 |
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