From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model

We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, cau...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Bouët, Antoine, Laborde Debucquet, David, Martimort, David
Formato: Journal Article
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Royal Economic Society 2021
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142494
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author Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Martimort, David
author_browse Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Martimort, David
author_facet Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Martimort, David
author_sort Bouët, Antoine
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns. Home, when subject to strong influence by inefficient producers, might be reluctant to adopt free trade, which may lead to limited tariff cuts and give a role for export subsidies.
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institution CGIAR Consortium
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publishDate 2021
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spelling CGSpace1424942025-02-24T06:48:35Z From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Martimort, David models policies asymmetric information model trade export subsidies export policies international trade We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two layers of informational asymmetries. Private information of Home producers on costs affects the design of ‘behind-the-border’ policies reflecting the political influence of inefficient producers. Home's supply is contracted, causing trade, and motivating the use of tariffs. Eliminating those instruments by means of a trade agreement may become impossible once Home has also private information on its redistributive concerns. Home, when subject to strong influence by inefficient producers, might be reluctant to adopt free trade, which may lead to limited tariff cuts and give a role for export subsidies. 2021-05-01 2024-05-22T12:10:35Z 2024-05-22T12:10:35Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142494 en https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150501 Limited Access Royal Economic Society Bouët, Antoine; Laborde Debucquet, David; and Martimort, David. 2021. From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model. Economic Journal 131(636): 1555–1592. https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa085
spellingShingle models
policies
asymmetric information model
trade
export subsidies
export policies
international trade
Bouët, Antoine
Laborde Debucquet, David
Martimort, David
From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
title From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
title_full From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
title_fullStr From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
title_full_unstemmed From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
title_short From inefficient behind-the-border policies to inefficient trade agreements: A two-tier asymmetric information model
title_sort from inefficient behind the border policies to inefficient trade agreements a two tier asymmetric information model
topic models
policies
asymmetric information model
trade
export subsidies
export policies
international trade
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/142494
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AT martimortdavid frominefficientbehindtheborderpoliciestoinefficienttradeagreementsatwotierasymmetricinformationmodel