Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior
Paying resource users to preserve features of their environment could in theory better align production and conservation goals. We show, however, that across a range of conservation dilemmas, they might not. We conduct a synthesis of dynamic games experiments built around collective action dilemmas...
| Main Authors: | , , , , , , , |
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Springer
2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/128709 |
| _version_ | 1855514360145772544 |
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| author | Bell, Andrew R. Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy Bhargava, Apurva Duthie, A. Bradley Zhang, Wei Sargent, Rebecca Lewis, Amy R. Kipchumba, Adams |
| author_browse | Bell, Andrew R. Bhargava, Apurva Duthie, A. Bradley Kipchumba, Adams Lewis, Amy R. Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy Sargent, Rebecca Zhang, Wei |
| author_facet | Bell, Andrew R. Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy Bhargava, Apurva Duthie, A. Bradley Zhang, Wei Sargent, Rebecca Lewis, Amy R. Kipchumba, Adams |
| author_sort | Bell, Andrew R. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Paying resource users to preserve features of their environment could in theory better align production and conservation goals. We show, however, that across a range of conservation dilemmas, they might not. We conduct a synthesis of dynamic games experiments built around collective action dilemmas in conservation, played across Europe, Africa, and Asia. We find, across this range of dilemmas, that while payments can encourage pro-conservation behavior, they often fail to capitalize on the potential for jointly improving productive and environmental outcomes, highlighting the more nuanced challenge of reconciling livelihoods with conservation goals. We further find production (yield) and the joint production-environment product (i.e., a measure of agricultural production multiplied by a measure of pro-conservation practice) are better preserved in groups that are more educated, more gender diverse and that better represent women. We discuss how the design of incentive programs can better align livelihood and environment goals. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace128709 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2023 |
| publishDateRange | 2023 |
| publishDateSort | 2023 |
| publisher | Springer |
| publisherStr | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1287092025-10-26T12:54:54Z Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior Bell, Andrew R. Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy Bhargava, Apurva Duthie, A. Bradley Zhang, Wei Sargent, Rebecca Lewis, Amy R. Kipchumba, Adams resources environment production conservation collective action livelihoods agricultural production education gender women incentives Paying resource users to preserve features of their environment could in theory better align production and conservation goals. We show, however, that across a range of conservation dilemmas, they might not. We conduct a synthesis of dynamic games experiments built around collective action dilemmas in conservation, played across Europe, Africa, and Asia. We find, across this range of dilemmas, that while payments can encourage pro-conservation behavior, they often fail to capitalize on the potential for jointly improving productive and environmental outcomes, highlighting the more nuanced challenge of reconciling livelihoods with conservation goals. We further find production (yield) and the joint production-environment product (i.e., a measure of agricultural production multiplied by a measure of pro-conservation practice) are better preserved in groups that are more educated, more gender diverse and that better represent women. We discuss how the design of incentive programs can better align livelihood and environment goals. 2023-02-08 2023-02-14T17:14:27Z 2023-02-14T17:14:27Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/128709 en https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153806 https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/11/114024 https://doi.org/10.1016/j.agsy.2015.11.012 Open Access Springer Bell, Andrew R.; Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy; Bhargava, Apurva; Duthie, A. Bradley; Zhang, Wei; Sargent, Rebecca; Lewis, Amy R.; and Kipchumba, Adams. 2023. Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior. Communications Earth & Environment 4. https://doi.org/10.1038/s43247-023-00689-6 |
| spellingShingle | resources environment production conservation collective action livelihoods agricultural production education gender women incentives Bell, Andrew R. Rakotonarivo, O. Sarobidy Bhargava, Apurva Duthie, A. Bradley Zhang, Wei Sargent, Rebecca Lewis, Amy R. Kipchumba, Adams Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior |
| title | Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior |
| title_full | Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior |
| title_fullStr | Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior |
| title_full_unstemmed | Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior |
| title_short | Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior |
| title_sort | financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro conservation behavior |
| topic | resources environment production conservation collective action livelihoods agricultural production education gender women incentives |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/128709 |
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