Financial incentives often fail to reconcile agricultural productivity and pro-conservation behavior
Paying resource users to preserve features of their environment could in theory better align production and conservation goals. We show, however, that across a range of conservation dilemmas, they might not. We conduct a synthesis of dynamic games experiments built around collective action dilemmas...
| Autores principales: | , , , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Springer
2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/128709 |
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