Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical.We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect cont...

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Autores principales: Alpízar, Francisco, Nordén, Anna, Pfaff, Alexander, Robalino, Juan
Formato: Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Springer, Berlín (Alemania) 2020
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/9535
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author Alpízar, Francisco
Nordén, Anna
Pfaff, Alexander
Robalino, Juan
author_browse Alpízar, Francisco
Nordén, Anna
Pfaff, Alexander
Robalino, Juan
author_facet Alpízar, Francisco
Nordén, Anna
Pfaff, Alexander
Robalino, Juan
author_sort Alpízar, Francisco
collection Repositorio CATIE
description When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical.We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.
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spelling RepoCATIE95352022-02-17T18:51:51Z Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate Alpízar, Francisco Nordén, Anna Pfaff, Alexander Robalino, Juan SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES BIENESTAR PUBLICO BIENES PUBLICOS CARBONO CONSERVACION POLITICAS DEFORESTACIÓN CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES ECONOMÍA ENCUESTAS COSTA RICA When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical.We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged. 2020-08-27T19:48:22Z 2020-08-27T19:48:22Z 2015 Artículo DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9981-2 https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/9535 en Environmental and Resource Economics (November 2015) info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess application/pdf Springer, Berlín (Alemania)
spellingShingle SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES
BIENESTAR PUBLICO
BIENES PUBLICOS
CARBONO
CONSERVACION
POLITICAS
DEFORESTACIÓN
CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES
ECONOMÍA
ENCUESTAS
COSTA RICA
Alpízar, Francisco
Nordén, Anna
Pfaff, Alexander
Robalino, Juan
Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_full Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_fullStr Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_full_unstemmed Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_short Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_sort unintended effects of targeting an environmental rebate
topic SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES
BIENESTAR PUBLICO
BIENES PUBLICOS
CARBONO
CONSERVACION
POLITICAS
DEFORESTACIÓN
CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES
ECONOMÍA
ENCUESTAS
COSTA RICA
url https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/9535
work_keys_str_mv AT alpizarfrancisco unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate
AT nordenanna unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate
AT pfaffalexander unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate
AT robalinojuan unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate