Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical.We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect cont...

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Autores principales:	Alpízar, Francisco, Nordén, Anna, Pfaff, Alexander, Robalino, Juan
Formato:	Artículo
Lenguaje:	Inglés
Publicado:	Springer, Berlín (Alemania) 2020
Materias:	SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES BIENESTAR PUBLICO BIENES PUBLICOS CARBONO CONSERVACION POLITICAS DEFORESTACIÓN CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES ECONOMÍA ENCUESTAS COSTA RICA
Acceso en línea:	https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/9535

id	RepoCATIE9535
record_format	dspace
spelling	RepoCATIE95352022-02-17T18:51:51Z Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate Alpízar, Francisco Nordén, Anna Pfaff, Alexander Robalino, Juan SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES BIENESTAR PUBLICO BIENES PUBLICOS CARBONO CONSERVACION POLITICAS DEFORESTACIÓN CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES ECONOMÍA ENCUESTAS COSTA RICA When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical.We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged. 2020-08-27T19:48:22Z 2020-08-27T19:48:22Z 2015 Artículo DOI: 10.1007/s10640-015-9981-2 https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/9535 en Environmental and Resource Economics (November 2015) info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess application/pdf Springer, Berlín (Alemania)
institution	Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigación y Enseñanza
collection	Repositorio CATIE
language	Inglés
topic	SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES BIENESTAR PUBLICO BIENES PUBLICOS CARBONO CONSERVACION POLITICAS DEFORESTACIÓN CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES ECONOMÍA ENCUESTAS COSTA RICA
spellingShingle	SERVICIOS AMBIENTALES BIENESTAR PUBLICO BIENES PUBLICOS CARBONO CONSERVACION POLITICAS DEFORESTACIÓN CONSERVACION DE BOSQUES ECONOMÍA ENCUESTAS COSTA RICA Alpízar, Francisco Nordén, Anna Pfaff, Alexander Robalino, Juan Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
description	When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical.We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects’ initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.
format	Artículo
author	Alpízar, Francisco Nordén, Anna Pfaff, Alexander Robalino, Juan
author_facet	Alpízar, Francisco Nordén, Anna Pfaff, Alexander Robalino, Juan
author_sort	Alpízar, Francisco
title	Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_short	Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_full	Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_fullStr	Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_full_unstemmed	Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate
title_sort	unintended effects of targeting an environmental rebate
publisher	Springer, Berlín (Alemania)
publishDate	2020
url	https://repositorio.catie.ac.cr/handle/11554/9535
work_keys_str_mv	AT alpizarfrancisco unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate AT nordenanna unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate AT pfaffalexander unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate AT robalinojuan unintendedeffectsoftargetinganenvironmentalrebate
_version_	1808117707762040832

Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

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