Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment
We study how distributive politics affects political budget cycles and voting within a federal country. Our model predicts not only that the president favors politically aligned governors with larger transfers, but also that voters favor gubernatorial candidates aligned with the expected presidentia...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Wiley
2020
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/7496 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecpo.12154 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12154 |
| _version_ | 1855484020973895680 |
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| author | Garofalo, Pablo Lema, Rolando Daniel Streb, Jorge M. |
| author_browse | Garofalo, Pablo Lema, Rolando Daniel Streb, Jorge M. |
| author_facet | Garofalo, Pablo Lema, Rolando Daniel Streb, Jorge M. |
| author_sort | Garofalo, Pablo |
| collection | INTA Digital |
| description | We study how distributive politics affects political budget cycles and voting within a federal country. Our model predicts not only that the president favors politically aligned governors with larger transfers, but also that voters favor gubernatorial candidates aligned with the expected presidential incumbent because larger transfers are expected in the future. These predictions are upheld by the data from Argentinean provinces during the 1984–2014 period. Our findings imply that political alignment can trump the selection effect of voting the most competent candidate. This can help explain in particular coattail effects when gubernatorial and presidential elections are concurrent. |
| format | Artículo |
| id | INTA7496 |
| institution | Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA -Argentina) |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateRange | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| publisherStr | Wiley |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | INTA74962020-07-01T11:51:17Z Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment Garofalo, Pablo Lema, Rolando Daniel Streb, Jorge M. Partidos Políticos Grupos de Interés Presupuestos Political Parties Budgets Interest Groups Coattail Effects Distributive Politics Federal Countries We study how distributive politics affects political budget cycles and voting within a federal country. Our model predicts not only that the president favors politically aligned governors with larger transfers, but also that voters favor gubernatorial candidates aligned with the expected presidential incumbent because larger transfers are expected in the future. These predictions are upheld by the data from Argentinean provinces during the 1984–2014 period. Our findings imply that political alignment can trump the selection effect of voting the most competent candidate. This can help explain in particular coattail effects when gubernatorial and presidential elections are concurrent. Estudiamos cómo la política distributiva afecta a los ciclos de presupuesto político y a la votación dentro de un país federal. Nuestro modelo predice no sólo que el presidente favorece a los gobernadores alineados políticamente con mayores transferencias, sino también que los votantes favorecen a los candidatos a gobernador alineados con el titular presidencial esperado porque se esperan mayores transferencias en el futuro. Estas predicciones son confirmadas por los datos de las provincias argentinas durante el período 1984-2014. Nuestros hallazgos implican que la alineación política puede triunfar sobre el efecto de selección de votar al candidato más competente. Esto puede ayudar a explicar en particular los efectos de la cola de cobertura cuando las elecciones gubernamentales y presidenciales son concurrentes. Centro de Investigación en Economía y Prospectiva Fil: Garofalo, Pablo. New Jersey City University. School of Business, Department of Economics; Estados Unidos Fil: Lema, Rolando Daniel. Instituto Nacional de Tecnología Agropecuaria (INTA). Centro de Investigación en Economía y Prospectiva (CIEP); Argentina Fil: Streb, Jorge M. Universidad del Cema; Argentina 2020-07-01T11:29:48Z 2020-07-01T11:29:48Z 2020-07 info:ar-repo/semantics/artículo info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/7496 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecpo.12154 Garofalo, P., Lema, D., & Streb, J. M. (2020). Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: The influence of political alignment. Economics & Politics. doi:10.1111/ecpo.12154 1468-0343 1468-0343 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12154 eng info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess application/pdf Wiley Economics & politics 32 (2) : 305-334 (July 2020) |
| spellingShingle | Partidos Políticos Grupos de Interés Presupuestos Political Parties Budgets Interest Groups Coattail Effects Distributive Politics Federal Countries Garofalo, Pablo Lema, Rolando Daniel Streb, Jorge M. Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment |
| title | Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment |
| title_full | Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment |
| title_fullStr | Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment |
| title_full_unstemmed | Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment |
| title_short | Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: the influence of political alignment |
| title_sort | political budget cycles and voting within a federal country the influence of political alignment |
| topic | Partidos Políticos Grupos de Interés Presupuestos Political Parties Budgets Interest Groups Coattail Effects Distributive Politics Federal Countries |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12123/7496 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ecpo.12154 https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12154 |
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