Simple Incentives and Group Dependence for Successful Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Evidence from an Experimental Game In Rural Lao PDR
In this article, we use a new game‐based tool to evaluate the immediate and longer term behavioral change potential of three different payments for ecosystem services (PES) delivery mechanisms: direct payments for individual performance, direct payments for group performance, and insurance. Results...
| Autores principales: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Wiley
2017
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/94530 |
Ejemplares similares: Simple Incentives and Group Dependence for Successful Payments for Ecosystem Services Programs: Evidence from an Experimental Game In Rural Lao PDR
- An Analysis of Ecosystem Services of Dry Dipterocarp Forests in Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR [Laotian]
- Assessing participatory photography as a method to understand local perspectives on environment and development in northern Lao PDR
- Community harvesting of trees in Tanzania under payments for ecosystem services (PES) schemes: Results of economic games in selected communities in Tanzania
- Technical Efficiency Analysis of Small-scale Cassava Farming in Lao PDR
- Trends in Latin American forestry decentralisations: legal frameworks, municipal governments and forest dependent groups
- Incentivized Payments in Experimental Games can Lead to Behavioural Change?