Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation
This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forest land appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more s...
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
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2001
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/18159 |
| _version_ | 1855514685652074496 |
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| author | Angelsen, A. |
| author_browse | Angelsen, A. |
| author_facet | Angelsen, A. |
| author_sort | Angelsen, A. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forest land appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace18159 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2001 |
| publishDateRange | 2001 |
| publishDateSort | 2001 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace181592025-01-24T14:11:56Z Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation Angelsen, A. deforestation communities game theory models resource allocation land use land clearance government conservation conflicts costs markets tropical forests This paper explores possible strategic interactions between the state and local community in games of tropical forest land appropriation. Three typical cases are discussed, corresponding to a development over time of increased resource competition and market integration. The local response to more state deforestation depends on the costs, market, and behavioral assumptions, and less on the structure of the game (Cournot or Stackelberg). The state fuels local deforestation by providing infrastructure (roads) which reduces the net costs of agricultural expansion, or when markets are imperfect and local behavior determined by survival needs. The game structure is, however, important for total deforestation. 2001 2012-06-04T09:06:09Z 2012-06-04T09:06:09Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/18159 en Angelsen, A. 2001. Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation . Land Economics 77 (2) :285-299. ISSN: 0023-7639. |
| spellingShingle | deforestation communities game theory models resource allocation land use land clearance government conservation conflicts costs markets tropical forests Angelsen, A. Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation |
| title | Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation |
| title_full | Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation |
| title_fullStr | Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation |
| title_short | Playing games in the forest: state-local conflicts of land appropriation |
| title_sort | playing games in the forest state local conflicts of land appropriation |
| topic | deforestation communities game theory models resource allocation land use land clearance government conservation conflicts costs markets tropical forests |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/18159 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT angelsena playinggamesintheforeststatelocalconflictsoflandappropriation |