Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games
The design of mechanisms for sustainable irrigation water management requires a deep understanding of the water value for local communities. We present results from a lab-in-the-field incentivized game that sheds light on valuation patterns of irrigation water, relative to its value in the game, amo...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Elsevier
2025
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/173580 |
| _version_ | 1855531804240379904 |
|---|---|
| author | Gafaro, M. Mantilla, C. |
| author_browse | Gafaro, M. Mantilla, C. |
| author_facet | Gafaro, M. Mantilla, C. |
| author_sort | Gafaro, M. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | The design of mechanisms for sustainable irrigation water management requires a deep understanding of the water value for local communities. We present results from a lab-in-the-field incentivized game that sheds light on valuation patterns of irrigation water, relative to its value in the game, among small farmers in Colombia. In this game, two players divide a jointly endowed agricultural land plot, with some pieces having direct access to irrigation water. Although the induced cost of irrigation water in our game was one token, farmers paid between 2.1 and 3.5 times this amount. We characterize a general bargaining game that can be used to identify valuation discrepancies in settings with relevant use conflicts. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace173580 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| publishDateRange | 2025 |
| publishDateSort | 2025 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| publisherStr | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1735802025-10-26T13:02:25Z Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games Gafaro, M. Mantilla, C. The design of mechanisms for sustainable irrigation water management requires a deep understanding of the water value for local communities. We present results from a lab-in-the-field incentivized game that sheds light on valuation patterns of irrigation water, relative to its value in the game, among small farmers in Colombia. In this game, two players divide a jointly endowed agricultural land plot, with some pieces having direct access to irrigation water. Although the induced cost of irrigation water in our game was one token, farmers paid between 2.1 and 3.5 times this amount. We characterize a general bargaining game that can be used to identify valuation discrepancies in settings with relevant use conflicts. 2025-04 2025-03-12T04:33:39Z 2025-03-12T04:33:39Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/173580 en Limited Access Elsevier Gafaro, M.; Mantilla, C. 2025. Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games. Water Resources and Economics, 50:100259. [doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wre.2025.100259] |
| spellingShingle | Gafaro, M. Mantilla, C. Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| title | Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| title_full | Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| title_fullStr | Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| title_full_unstemmed | Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| title_short | Water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| title_sort | water valuation in incentivized bargaining games |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/173580 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT gafarom watervaluationinincentivizedbargaininggames AT mantillac watervaluationinincentivizedbargaininggames |