Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia
This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. We identify and test three separate processes that determine assets brought to marriage: assortative matching; compensating parental transfers at marriage; and strategic behavior by parents. We find ample evidence for the...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2005
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/172287 |
| _version_ | 1855518656662863872 |
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| author | Fafchamps, Marcel Quisumbing, Agnes R. |
| author_browse | Fafchamps, Marcel Quisumbing, Agnes R. |
| author_facet | Fafchamps, Marcel Quisumbing, Agnes R. |
| author_sort | Fafchamps, Marcel |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. We identify and test three separate processes that determine assets brought to marriage: assortative matching; compensating parental transfers at marriage; and strategic behavior by parents. We find ample evidence for the first, none for the second, and some evidence of the third for brides. We also find no evidence of competition for parental assets among siblings. Results suggest that parents do not transfer wealth to children in ways that compensate for marriage market outcomes. Certain parents, however, give more assets to daughters whenever doing so increases the chances of marrying a wealthy groom. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace172287 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2005 |
| publishDateRange | 2005 |
| publishDateSort | 2005 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| publisherStr | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1722872025-02-19T14:06:54Z Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia Fafchamps, Marcel Quisumbing, Agnes R. property cash transfers rural population inheritance assets This paper examines the determinants of assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. We identify and test three separate processes that determine assets brought to marriage: assortative matching; compensating parental transfers at marriage; and strategic behavior by parents. We find ample evidence for the first, none for the second, and some evidence of the third for brides. We also find no evidence of competition for parental assets among siblings. Results suggest that parents do not transfer wealth to children in ways that compensate for marriage market outcomes. Certain parents, however, give more assets to daughters whenever doing so increases the chances of marrying a wealthy groom. 2005-06 2025-01-29T12:59:42Z 2025-01-29T12:59:42Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/172287 en Limited Access Elsevier Fafchamps, Marcel; Quisumbing, Agnes R. 2005. Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia. Journal of Development Economics 77(1): 1-25. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2004.02.003 |
| spellingShingle | property cash transfers rural population inheritance assets Fafchamps, Marcel Quisumbing, Agnes R. Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia |
| title | Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia |
| title_full | Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia |
| title_fullStr | Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia |
| title_full_unstemmed | Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia |
| title_short | Assets at marriage in rural Ethiopia |
| title_sort | assets at marriage in rural ethiopia |
| topic | property cash transfers rural population inheritance assets |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/172287 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT fafchampsmarcel assetsatmarriageinruralethiopia AT quisumbingagnesr assetsatmarriageinruralethiopia |