U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?

We present an empirical analysis of factors determining trade wars and agreements under U.S. trade law Section 301. A system of two probit equations is estimated using historical data on Section 301 cases to determine which economic and political factors increase the likelihood of trade frictions. T...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Kherallah, Mylene, Beghin, John C.
Formato: Journal Article
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: Wiley 1998
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/171709
_version_ 1855513923154870272
author Kherallah, Mylene
Beghin, John C.
author_browse Beghin, John C.
Kherallah, Mylene
author_facet Kherallah, Mylene
Beghin, John C.
author_sort Kherallah, Mylene
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description We present an empirical analysis of factors determining trade wars and agreements under U.S. trade law Section 301. A system of two probit equations is estimated using historical data on Section 301 cases to determine which economic and political factors increase the likelihood of trade frictions. The likelihood of trade war increases when the United States's export share in the world market declines, when the United States is less dependent on the market of the targeted country, when foreign policy makers are in an election year, and when negotiations relate to highly protected and unionized industries in the targeted country.
format Journal Article
id CGSpace171709
institution CGIAR Consortium
language Inglés
publishDate 1998
publishDateRange 1998
publishDateSort 1998
publisher Wiley
publisherStr Wiley
record_format dspace
spelling CGSpace1717092025-02-19T14:00:00Z U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war? Kherallah, Mylene Beghin, John C. trade We present an empirical analysis of factors determining trade wars and agreements under U.S. trade law Section 301. A system of two probit equations is estimated using historical data on Section 301 cases to determine which economic and political factors increase the likelihood of trade frictions. The likelihood of trade war increases when the United States's export share in the world market declines, when the United States is less dependent on the market of the targeted country, when foreign policy makers are in an election year, and when negotiations relate to highly protected and unionized industries in the targeted country. 1998-02 2025-01-29T12:58:36Z 2025-01-29T12:58:36Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/171709 en Limited Access Wiley Kherallah, Mylene; Beghin, John C. 1998. U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war? American Journal of Agricultural Economics 80(1): 15-29. https://doi.org/10.2307/3180265.
spellingShingle trade
Kherallah, Mylene
Beghin, John C.
U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?
title U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?
title_full U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?
title_fullStr U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?
title_full_unstemmed U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?
title_short U.S. trade threats: rhetoric or war?
title_sort u s trade threats rhetoric or war
topic trade
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/171709
work_keys_str_mv AT kherallahmylene ustradethreatsrhetoricorwar
AT beghinjohnc ustradethreatsrhetoricorwar