Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost-of-production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines
This article examines the moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost‐of‐production (COP) crop insurance products. Building on existing crop insurance models of moral hazard, as well as a survey‐based data set that allows us to separately identify moral hazard from adverse selection, we find...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
Wiley
2019
|
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164749 |
Similar Items: Moral hazard and adverse selection effects of cost-of-production crop insurance: evidence from the Philippines
- Advantageous selection in crop insurance: Theory and evidence
- Input use under cost-of-production crop insurance: Theory and evidence
- Picture-based insurance: Is it sustainable? Effects on willingness to pay, adverse selection, and moral hazard
- Group lending with peer selection and moral hazard
- Economic impacts of integrated pest management (IPM) farmer field schools (FFS): evidence from onion farmers in the Philippines
- Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment