Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts
In developing countries, the emergence of informal groundwater markets is accidental rather than planned due to the water scarcity and supply-side constraints. It is less often that water markets are assessed for agents bargaining power and equity impacts. In this paper, I examine the relative barga...
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
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Public Library of Science
2020
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164429 |
| _version_ | 1855521808146497536 |
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| author | Yashodha |
| author_browse | Yashodha |
| author_facet | Yashodha |
| author_sort | Yashodha |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | In developing countries, the emergence of informal groundwater markets is accidental rather than planned due to the water scarcity and supply-side constraints. It is less often that water markets are assessed for agents bargaining power and equity impacts. In this paper, I examine the relative bargaining power of sellers and buyers in informal groundwater markets in India. To understand the process of bargaining, a framed-field experiment is conducted with actual buyers and sellers in groundwater contracts. In the experiment, sellers and buyers make a series of choices between output-shared and fixed-price contracts under varied risk conditions, first individually and then jointly. I define bargaining power as the relative ability of the agent to influence the joint decision for their individually preferred contract type. I find that there is a large preference disagreement between sellers and buyers. Buyers have preferences for output-shared contracts while sellers’ choices are motivated by expected earnings. Using the random-parameter probit model, I show that sellers have relatively more power to drive the joint decision in their favour. Nevertheless, factors like interpersonal relationships between buyers and sellers, such as kinship ties, long contractual history, and higher education of buyers augment buyers' power relative bargaining power. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace164429 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2020 |
| publishDateRange | 2020 |
| publishDateSort | 2020 |
| publisher | Public Library of Science |
| publisherStr | Public Library of Science |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1644292025-01-24T14:12:36Z Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts Yashodha general agricultural and biological sciences general biochemistry genetics and molecular biology general medicine In developing countries, the emergence of informal groundwater markets is accidental rather than planned due to the water scarcity and supply-side constraints. It is less often that water markets are assessed for agents bargaining power and equity impacts. In this paper, I examine the relative bargaining power of sellers and buyers in informal groundwater markets in India. To understand the process of bargaining, a framed-field experiment is conducted with actual buyers and sellers in groundwater contracts. In the experiment, sellers and buyers make a series of choices between output-shared and fixed-price contracts under varied risk conditions, first individually and then jointly. I define bargaining power as the relative ability of the agent to influence the joint decision for their individually preferred contract type. I find that there is a large preference disagreement between sellers and buyers. Buyers have preferences for output-shared contracts while sellers’ choices are motivated by expected earnings. Using the random-parameter probit model, I show that sellers have relatively more power to drive the joint decision in their favour. Nevertheless, factors like interpersonal relationships between buyers and sellers, such as kinship ties, long contractual history, and higher education of buyers augment buyers' power relative bargaining power. 2020-09-30 2024-12-19T12:53:52Z 2024-12-19T12:53:52Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164429 en Open Access Public Library of Science Yashodha, ; Yashodha. 2020. Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts. PLoS ONE, Volume 15 no. 9 p. e0236696 |
| spellingShingle | general agricultural and biological sciences general biochemistry genetics and molecular biology general medicine Yashodha Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| title | Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| title_full | Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| title_fullStr | Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| title_full_unstemmed | Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| title_short | Do buyers have bargaining power? Evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| title_sort | do buyers have bargaining power evidence from informal groundwater contracts |
| topic | general agricultural and biological sciences general biochemistry genetics and molecular biology general medicine |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164429 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT yashodha dobuyershavebargainingpowerevidencefrominformalgroundwatercontracts |