Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production

Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from...

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Main Authors: Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan, Yashodha, Johny, Judit
Format: Journal Article
Language:Inglés
Published: Public Library of Science 2021
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164212
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author Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan
Yashodha
Johny, Judit
author_browse Johny, Judit
Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan
Yashodha
author_facet Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan
Yashodha
Johny, Judit
author_sort Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability.
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spelling CGSpace1642122025-01-24T14:12:36Z Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan Yashodha Johny, Judit Contract farming in seed production has played an instrumental role in bringing private investment into seed research and production. As developing countries have predominantly small and marginal farmers, the number of inefficiencies that arise from seed contractual agreements hinders producers from realizing the full potential benefits from seed contracts. We carried out an economic experiment with real producers and organizers currently engaged in seed production to analyze their preference for group seed contracts, its sustainability and welfare implications in the seed value chain. The producers are offered two types of group contracts: B and C. Contract B involves a company-organizer-seed producer group (SPG) whereas contract C removes the organizer and directly engages with the SPG (company → SPG). In the experiment, producers are asked to choose between an existing contract and either of the proposed group contracts. The experiment consists of two treatments: (i) concealed and revealed price information between agents, and (ii) presence and absence of a local organizer while making the decision. We find that the preference for group contract B is higher than for group contract C, suggesting the need for producers bargaining which can be achieved through group contract in the existing contract, Bargaining is high (6.3 percentage points) when price information is concealed. SPGs survive for about four out of five rounds and more than half of the groups (53%) formed in the first round survived throughout the five rounds, indicating a very high group sustainability. 2021-08-18 2024-12-19T12:53:36Z 2024-12-19T12:53:36Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164212 en Open Access Public Library of Science Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan; Yashodha and Johny, Judit. 2021. Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production. PLoS ONE, Volume 16 no. 8 p. e0255176
spellingShingle Veettil, Prakashan Chellattan
Yashodha
Johny, Judit
Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
title Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
title_full Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
title_fullStr Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
title_full_unstemmed Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
title_short Group contracts and sustainability: Experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
title_sort group contracts and sustainability experimental evidence from smallholder seed production
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/164212
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AT yashodha groupcontractsandsustainabilityexperimentalevidencefromsmallholderseedproduction
AT johnyjudit groupcontractsandsustainabilityexperimentalevidencefromsmallholderseedproduction