National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities
Abstract. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welf...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Wiley
2008
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162383 |
| _version_ | 1855540850711330816 |
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| author | Roy, Devesh Gulati, Sumeet |
| author_browse | Gulati, Sumeet Roy, Devesh |
| author_facet | Roy, Devesh Gulati, Sumeet |
| author_sort | Roy, Devesh |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Abstract. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare‐maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare‐maximizing policy to violate National Treatment. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace162383 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateRange | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | Wiley |
| publisherStr | Wiley |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1623832024-11-21T10:02:43Z National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities Roy, Devesh Gulati, Sumeet agriculture Abstract. We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare‐maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare‐maximizing policy to violate National Treatment. 2008-11 2024-11-21T10:02:43Z 2024-11-21T10:02:43Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162383 en Limited Access Wiley Roy, Devesh; Gulati, Sumeet. 2008. National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 41(4): 1445-1471 |
| spellingShingle | agriculture Roy, Devesh Gulati, Sumeet National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| title | National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| title_full | National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| title_fullStr | National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| title_full_unstemmed | National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| title_short | National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| title_sort | national treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities |
| topic | agriculture |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162383 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT roydevesh nationaltreatmentandtheoptimalregulationofenvironmentalexternalities AT gulatisumeet nationaltreatmentandtheoptimalregulationofenvironmentalexternalities |