Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement

This paper studies an economy in which the government is not able to perfectly enforce tax compliance among operating firms, and compares it with a similar economy but with perfect tax enforcement. I develop a competitive general equilibrium model where imperfect tax enforcement may affect aggregate...

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Autor principal: Robles, Miguel
Formato: Artículo preliminar
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: International Food Policy Research Institute 2009
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161815
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author Robles, Miguel
author_browse Robles, Miguel
author_facet Robles, Miguel
author_sort Robles, Miguel
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description This paper studies an economy in which the government is not able to perfectly enforce tax compliance among operating firms, and compares it with a similar economy but with perfect tax enforcement. I develop a competitive general equilibrium model where imperfect tax enforcement may affect aggregate outcomes through two mechanisms. First, it may distort firms' optimal output level as long as the probability of avoiding tax compliance is related to the firm's size. Second, poor tax enforcement may lead to a low provision of the public goods that complement firms' productivity. The results for a calibrated version of the model suggest that in economies with tax enforcement problems, aggregate output might be reduced by 12 percent. I also conclude that sizable aggregate effects can be obtained only when the public goods mechanism is at work.
format Artículo preliminar
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institution CGIAR Consortium
language Inglés
publishDate 2009
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spelling CGSpace1618152025-11-06T06:05:08Z Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement Robles, Miguel taxes public goods informal sector firm size social protection institutions economic development infrastructure This paper studies an economy in which the government is not able to perfectly enforce tax compliance among operating firms, and compares it with a similar economy but with perfect tax enforcement. I develop a competitive general equilibrium model where imperfect tax enforcement may affect aggregate outcomes through two mechanisms. First, it may distort firms' optimal output level as long as the probability of avoiding tax compliance is related to the firm's size. Second, poor tax enforcement may lead to a low provision of the public goods that complement firms' productivity. The results for a calibrated version of the model suggest that in economies with tax enforcement problems, aggregate output might be reduced by 12 percent. I also conclude that sizable aggregate effects can be obtained only when the public goods mechanism is at work. 2009 2024-11-21T09:58:28Z 2024-11-21T09:58:28Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161815 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Robles, Miguel. 2009. Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement. IFPRI Discussion Paper 845. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161815
spellingShingle taxes
public goods
informal sector
firm size
social protection
institutions
economic development
infrastructure
Robles, Miguel
Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
title Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
title_full Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
title_fullStr Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
title_full_unstemmed Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
title_short Aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
title_sort aggregate effects of imperfect tax enforcement
topic taxes
public goods
informal sector
firm size
social protection
institutions
economic development
infrastructure
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161815
work_keys_str_mv AT roblesmiguel aggregateeffectsofimperfecttaxenforcement