Property rights in a flea market economy

This paper studies liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how property rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We find that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses resulting from such instances are small. This, howeve...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores principales: Fafchamps, Marcel, Minten, Bart
Formato: Artículo preliminar
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: International Food Policy Research Institute 1999
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161324
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author Fafchamps, Marcel
Minten, Bart
author_browse Fafchamps, Marcel
Minten, Bart
author_facet Fafchamps, Marcel
Minten, Bart
author_sort Fafchamps, Marcel
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description This paper studies liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how property rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We find that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses resulting from such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal institutions -- actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft -- but from traders’ reluctance to expose themselves to opportunism. As a result, Malagasy grain trade resembles a flea market, with little or no forward contracting and high transactions costs. The dominant contract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust is established primarily through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other traders. Information on bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non payment.
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publishDate 1999
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spelling CGSpace1613242025-11-06T07:25:42Z Property rights in a flea market economy Fafchamps, Marcel Minten, Bart property rights grain This paper studies liberalized grain markets in Madagascar and examines how property rights are protected and contracts are enforced among agricultural traders. We find that the incidence of theft and breach of contract is low and that the losses resulting from such instances are small. This, however, does not result from reliance on legal institutions -- actual recourse to police and courts is fairly rare, except in cases of theft -- but from traders’ reluctance to expose themselves to opportunism. As a result, Malagasy grain trade resembles a flea market, with little or no forward contracting and high transactions costs. The dominant contract enforcement mechanism is trust-based relationships. Trust is established primarily through repeated interaction with little role for referral by other traders. Information on bad clients does not circulate widely, hence severely limiting group punishments for non payment. 1999 2024-11-21T09:54:55Z 2024-11-21T09:54:55Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161324 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Fafchamps, Marcel; Minten, Bart. 1999. Property rights in a flea market economy. MTID Discussion Paper 27. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161324
spellingShingle property rights
grain
Fafchamps, Marcel
Minten, Bart
Property rights in a flea market economy
title Property rights in a flea market economy
title_full Property rights in a flea market economy
title_fullStr Property rights in a flea market economy
title_full_unstemmed Property rights in a flea market economy
title_short Property rights in a flea market economy
title_sort property rights in a flea market economy
topic property rights
grain
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161324
work_keys_str_mv AT fafchampsmarcel propertyrightsinafleamarketeconomy
AT mintenbart propertyrightsinafleamarketeconomy