An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption
This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. The results reveal that on the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism only if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter's side, voters focus on...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2008
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| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/160690 |
| _version_ | 1855513801358573568 |
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| author | Viceisza, Angelino |
| author_browse | Viceisza, Angelino |
| author_facet | Viceisza, Angelino |
| author_sort | Viceisza, Angelino |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. The results reveal that on the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism only if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter's side, voters focus on the difference between the tax rate in their own jurisdiction versus that in another jurisdiction. If the voters' tax rate is deemed unfair compared to that in the other jurisdiction, voters are less likely to re-elect. These findings support the claim by Besley and Case (1995) that incumbent behavior and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition, suggesting that our laboratory experiments have some external validity. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace160690 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2008 |
| publishDateRange | 2008 |
| publishDateSort | 2008 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1606902025-11-06T05:05:00Z An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption Viceisza, Angelino corruption experimentation social protection institutions politics taxes This study reports theory-testing laboratory experiments on the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. The results reveal that on the incumbent's side, yardstick competition acts as a corruption-taming mechanism only if the incumbent politician is female. On the voter's side, voters focus on the difference between the tax rate in their own jurisdiction versus that in another jurisdiction. If the voters' tax rate is deemed unfair compared to that in the other jurisdiction, voters are less likely to re-elect. These findings support the claim by Besley and Case (1995) that incumbent behavior and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition, suggesting that our laboratory experiments have some external validity. 2008 2024-11-21T09:51:36Z 2024-11-21T09:51:36Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/160690 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Viceisza, Angelino. 2008. An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption. IFPRI Discussion Paper 774. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/160690 |
| spellingShingle | corruption experimentation social protection institutions politics taxes Viceisza, Angelino An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| title | An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| title_full | An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| title_fullStr | An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| title_full_unstemmed | An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| title_short | An experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| title_sort | experimental inquiry into the effect of yardstick competition on corruption |
| topic | corruption experimentation social protection institutions politics taxes |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/160690 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT viceiszaangelino anexperimentalinquiryintotheeffectofyardstickcompetitiononcorruption AT viceiszaangelino experimentalinquiryintotheeffectofyardstickcompetitiononcorruption |