Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda
In many African countries, governments are re-thinking the role of the state in centrally providing certain goods and services. The rights and responsibilities for providing various public goods are being decentralized to lower levels of government administration, and/or being devolved directly to l...
| Autores principales: | , , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2003
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/156475 |
| _version_ | 1855521398185787392 |
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| author | McCarthy, Nancy McDermott, John Coleman, Paul |
| author_browse | Coleman, Paul McCarthy, Nancy McDermott, John |
| author_facet | McCarthy, Nancy McDermott, John Coleman, Paul |
| author_sort | McCarthy, Nancy |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | In many African countries, governments are re-thinking the role of the state in centrally providing certain goods and services. The rights and responsibilities for providing various public goods are being decentralized to lower levels of government administration, and/or being devolved directly to local citizens or user groups themselves. It is thus critical to ask: under what circumstances will local groups provide the socially optimal level of the public good? In this paper, we apply this question to the case of controlling an important vector-borne livestock disease in Uganda, trypanosomosis, which is transmitted by the tsetse fly. We investigate the underlying epidemiology of transmission and different options for control, and the implications for group provision of control, within the framework of a game-theoretic model. Results indicate that individual incentives to uptake tsetse and trypanosomosis control differ widely across different control methods. Since the costs of successfully implementing collective action are affected by individual incentives to participate in collective action, the model predicts which method/s are likely to be successfully implemented at the community level. More broadly, the model highlights under what circumstances community-provision is not likely to be optimal, depending on the underlying epidemiology of the disease, technological parameters, prevailing market characteristics, and socio-cultural conditions. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace156475 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| publishDateRange | 2003 |
| publishDateSort | 2003 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1564752025-11-06T05:50:28Z Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda McCarthy, Nancy McDermott, John Coleman, Paul animal health diseases epidemics state intervention livestock trypanosomosis glossina social norms social networks cooperative activities In many African countries, governments are re-thinking the role of the state in centrally providing certain goods and services. The rights and responsibilities for providing various public goods are being decentralized to lower levels of government administration, and/or being devolved directly to local citizens or user groups themselves. It is thus critical to ask: under what circumstances will local groups provide the socially optimal level of the public good? In this paper, we apply this question to the case of controlling an important vector-borne livestock disease in Uganda, trypanosomosis, which is transmitted by the tsetse fly. We investigate the underlying epidemiology of transmission and different options for control, and the implications for group provision of control, within the framework of a game-theoretic model. Results indicate that individual incentives to uptake tsetse and trypanosomosis control differ widely across different control methods. Since the costs of successfully implementing collective action are affected by individual incentives to participate in collective action, the model predicts which method/s are likely to be successfully implemented at the community level. More broadly, the model highlights under what circumstances community-provision is not likely to be optimal, depending on the underlying epidemiology of the disease, technological parameters, prevailing market characteristics, and socio-cultural conditions. 2003 2024-10-24T12:44:17Z 2024-10-24T12:44:17Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/156475 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute McCarthy, Nancy; McDermott, John; Coleman, Paul. 2003. Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda. EPTD Discussion Paper 103. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/156475 |
| spellingShingle | animal health diseases epidemics state intervention livestock trypanosomosis glossina social norms social networks cooperative activities McCarthy, Nancy McDermott, John Coleman, Paul Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda |
| title | Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda |
| title_full | Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda |
| title_fullStr | Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda |
| title_full_unstemmed | Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda |
| title_short | Animal health and the role of communities: an example of trypanasomosis control options in Uganda |
| title_sort | animal health and the role of communities an example of trypanasomosis control options in uganda |
| topic | animal health diseases epidemics state intervention livestock trypanosomosis glossina social norms social networks cooperative activities |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/156475 |
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