Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity
When a new technology consists of sequences of innovations that culminate in a final consumer product, the balance between successive innovators is one of the main concerns in the design of the patent system. While intertemporal aspects of incentive are critical in this environment of sequential inn...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2002
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/155761 |
| _version_ | 1855528240524820480 |
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| author | Koo, Bonwoo Wright, Brian D. |
| author_browse | Koo, Bonwoo Wright, Brian D. |
| author_facet | Koo, Bonwoo Wright, Brian D. |
| author_sort | Koo, Bonwoo |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | When a new technology consists of sequences of innovations that culminate in a final consumer product, the balance between successive innovators is one of the main concerns in the design of the patent system. While intertemporal aspects of incentive are critical in this environment of sequential innovations, time plays a minor role in existing literature on dynamic models. By focusing on the incentives of follow-on innovators who commercialize an initial invention, this study examines the dynamic implications of the patent instrument (e.g., patent life) via a positive analysis. It shows that a long patent life may encourage innovation incentives and increase social welfare, contrary to existing arguments that argue that long patent life always discourages the incentive for subsequent innovations. This study also examines the implications of finite patent system in different market structures. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace155761 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2002 |
| publishDateRange | 2002 |
| publishDateSort | 2002 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1557612025-11-06T06:31:43Z Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity Koo, Bonwoo Wright, Brian D. patents economic aspects research innovation licences agreements When a new technology consists of sequences of innovations that culminate in a final consumer product, the balance between successive innovators is one of the main concerns in the design of the patent system. While intertemporal aspects of incentive are critical in this environment of sequential innovations, time plays a minor role in existing literature on dynamic models. By focusing on the incentives of follow-on innovators who commercialize an initial invention, this study examines the dynamic implications of the patent instrument (e.g., patent life) via a positive analysis. It shows that a long patent life may encourage innovation incentives and increase social welfare, contrary to existing arguments that argue that long patent life always discourages the incentive for subsequent innovations. This study also examines the implications of finite patent system in different market structures. 2002 2024-10-24T12:42:32Z 2024-10-24T12:42:32Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/155761 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Koo, Bonwoo; Wright, Brian D. 2002. Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity. EPTD Discussion Paper 88. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/155761 |
| spellingShingle | patents economic aspects research innovation licences agreements Koo, Bonwoo Wright, Brian D. Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity |
| title | Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity |
| title_full | Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity |
| title_fullStr | Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity |
| title_short | Economics of patenting a research tool: participation and productivity |
| title_sort | economics of patenting a research tool participation and productivity |
| topic | patents economic aspects research innovation licences agreements |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/155761 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT koobonwoo economicsofpatentingaresearchtoolparticipationandproductivity AT wrightbriand economicsofpatentingaresearchtoolparticipationandproductivity |