Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is the largest public works employment project in the world. Its most direct poverty reduction pathway is through boosting employment and income for the poor. How effectively this direct transfer mechanism reduces poverty tu...

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Autores principales: Liu, Yanyan, Barrett, Christopher B.
Formato: Artículo preliminar
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: International Food Policy Research Institute 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154026
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author Liu, Yanyan
Barrett, Christopher B.
author_browse Barrett, Christopher B.
Liu, Yanyan
author_facet Liu, Yanyan
Barrett, Christopher B.
author_sort Liu, Yanyan
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is the largest public works employment project in the world. Its most direct poverty reduction pathway is through boosting employment and income for the poor. How effectively this direct transfer mechanism reduces poverty turns fundamentally on the degree to which MGNREGS targets its resources toward otherwise-poor households. To explore this question, we use the 2009/10 National Sample Survey data to describe patterns of seeking, rationing, and participation in MGNREGS. At the national level, we find that the self-targeting design of MGNREGS leads to greater rates of self-selection into the program by poorer and scheduled tribe or scheduled caste households. However, the administrative rationing of MGNREGS jobs is not pro-poor but, rather, exhibits a sort of middle-class bias. At the state level, roughly half of 27 states exhibit rationing and participation profiles that signal effective pro-poor targeting. The other half of India’s states struggle to avoid high rates and regressive patterns of administrative rationing of MGNREGS jobs to which the poor have a legal right. Our results suggest that MGNREGS can be effectively deployed to attract, employ and improve the well-being of poor rural households but there remains room for improvement and perhaps much to be learned from in-depth comparative analysis of MGNREGS program implementation across states.
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spelling CGSpace1540262025-11-06T06:05:21Z Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme Liu, Yanyan Barrett, Christopher B. public works rations poverty alleviation targeting employment India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is the largest public works employment project in the world. Its most direct poverty reduction pathway is through boosting employment and income for the poor. How effectively this direct transfer mechanism reduces poverty turns fundamentally on the degree to which MGNREGS targets its resources toward otherwise-poor households. To explore this question, we use the 2009/10 National Sample Survey data to describe patterns of seeking, rationing, and participation in MGNREGS. At the national level, we find that the self-targeting design of MGNREGS leads to greater rates of self-selection into the program by poorer and scheduled tribe or scheduled caste households. However, the administrative rationing of MGNREGS jobs is not pro-poor but, rather, exhibits a sort of middle-class bias. At the state level, roughly half of 27 states exhibit rationing and participation profiles that signal effective pro-poor targeting. The other half of India’s states struggle to avoid high rates and regressive patterns of administrative rationing of MGNREGS jobs to which the poor have a legal right. Our results suggest that MGNREGS can be effectively deployed to attract, employ and improve the well-being of poor rural households but there remains room for improvement and perhaps much to be learned from in-depth comparative analysis of MGNREGS program implementation across states. 2012 2024-10-01T13:59:01Z 2024-10-01T13:59:01Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154026 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Liu, Yanyan; Barrett, Christopher B. 2012. Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1218. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154026
spellingShingle public works
rations
poverty alleviation
targeting
employment
Liu, Yanyan
Barrett, Christopher B.
Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
title Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
title_full Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
title_fullStr Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
title_full_unstemmed Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
title_short Heterogeneous pro–poor targeting in India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
title_sort heterogeneous pro poor targeting in india s mahatma gandhi national rural employment guarantee scheme
topic public works
rations
poverty alleviation
targeting
employment
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/154026
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AT barrettchristopherb heterogeneouspropoortargetinginindiasmahatmagandhinationalruralemploymentguaranteescheme