Collective reputation, social norms, and participation
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust....
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153925 |
| _version_ | 1855528785607131136 |
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| author | Saak, Alexander E. |
| author_browse | Saak, Alexander E. |
| author_facet | Saak, Alexander E. |
| author_sort | Saak, Alexander E. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust. The optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium, (3) customers' information regarding firms' quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup information about firms' quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into account direct implementation costs. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace153925 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateRange | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1539252025-11-06T06:35:20Z Collective reputation, social norms, and participation Saak, Alexander E. monitoring penalties This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust. The optimal number of firms that share a common reputation is greater when (1) trades are more frequent and public information is disseminated more rapidly, (2) the deviation gain is smaller compared to the quality premium, (3) customers' information regarding firms' quality is more precise, or (4) intragroup information about firms' quality is more global. From a positive perspective, we suggest how social norms can influence the reputation of regional products. We also offer an efficiency explanation for food scares. From a normative point of view, in our model, protection of geographical indications increases and mandatory traceability decreases welfare and incentives to provide quality without taking into account direct implementation costs. 2011 2024-10-01T13:58:25Z 2024-10-01T13:58:25Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153925 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Saak, Alexander E. 2011. Collective reputation, social norms, and participation. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1107. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153925 |
| spellingShingle | monitoring penalties Saak, Alexander E. Collective reputation, social norms, and participation |
| title | Collective reputation, social norms, and participation |
| title_full | Collective reputation, social norms, and participation |
| title_fullStr | Collective reputation, social norms, and participation |
| title_full_unstemmed | Collective reputation, social norms, and participation |
| title_short | Collective reputation, social norms, and participation |
| title_sort | collective reputation social norms and participation |
| topic | monitoring penalties |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153925 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT saakalexandere collectivereputationsocialnormsandparticipation |