Infectious disease detection with private information

In this paper we study incentives to report clinically suspect situations in a simple model of an infectious animal disease with limited diagnostic resource. We characterize a transfer scheme that sustains credible reporting and implements an efficient test allocation. In a game without monetary tra...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Saak, Alexander E.
Formato: Artículo preliminar
Lenguaje:Inglés
Publicado: International Food Policy Research Institute 2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153816
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author Saak, Alexander E.
author_browse Saak, Alexander E.
author_facet Saak, Alexander E.
author_sort Saak, Alexander E.
collection Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace)
description In this paper we study incentives to report clinically suspect situations in a simple model of an infectious animal disease with limited diagnostic resource. We characterize a transfer scheme that sustains credible reporting and implements an efficient test allocation. In a game without monetary transfers, credible reporting and first-best targeted testing are achievable in both laissez-faire and efficient disease control regimes when the disease occurrence among few well-informed producers is unlikely. When the number of producers is small, random testing is optimal under mandatory depopulation of untested animals, but credible reporting can be necessary for testing to improve welfare under laissez-faire disease control if private information is sufficiently precise. When the number of producers is large, random testing always improves welfare, and if private information is precise, disease occurrence is unlikely, and testing capacity is small, efficient testing is achievable without transfers in the efficient disease control regime.
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spelling CGSpace1538162025-11-06T07:26:14Z Infectious disease detection with private information Saak, Alexander E. diseases information In this paper we study incentives to report clinically suspect situations in a simple model of an infectious animal disease with limited diagnostic resource. We characterize a transfer scheme that sustains credible reporting and implements an efficient test allocation. In a game without monetary transfers, credible reporting and first-best targeted testing are achievable in both laissez-faire and efficient disease control regimes when the disease occurrence among few well-informed producers is unlikely. When the number of producers is small, random testing is optimal under mandatory depopulation of untested animals, but credible reporting can be necessary for testing to improve welfare under laissez-faire disease control if private information is sufficiently precise. When the number of producers is large, random testing always improves welfare, and if private information is precise, disease occurrence is unlikely, and testing capacity is small, efficient testing is achievable without transfers in the efficient disease control regime. 2012 2024-10-01T13:57:49Z 2024-10-01T13:57:49Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153816 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Saak, Alexander E. 2012. Infectious disease detection with private information. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1162. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153816
spellingShingle diseases
information
Saak, Alexander E.
Infectious disease detection with private information
title Infectious disease detection with private information
title_full Infectious disease detection with private information
title_fullStr Infectious disease detection with private information
title_full_unstemmed Infectious disease detection with private information
title_short Infectious disease detection with private information
title_sort infectious disease detection with private information
topic diseases
information
url https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153816
work_keys_str_mv AT saakalexandere infectiousdiseasedetectionwithprivateinformation