Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity
While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in explaining why share tenancy contracts are prevalent and diffusing in many developing countries. Using a unique tenant-landlord matched dataset f...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
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International Food Policy Research Institute
2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153518 |
| _version_ | 1855527636309114880 |
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| author | Ghebru, Hosaena H. Holden, Stein |
| author_browse | Ghebru, Hosaena H. Holden, Stein |
| author_facet | Ghebru, Hosaena H. Holden, Stein |
| author_sort | Ghebru, Hosaena H. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in explaining why share tenancy contracts are prevalent and diffusing in many developing countries. Using a unique tenant-landlord matched dataset from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how the tenants’ strategic response to the varying economic and tenure-security status of the landlords can explain sharecroppers’ productivity differentials. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace153518 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2013 |
| publishDateRange | 2013 |
| publishDateSort | 2013 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1535182025-11-06T06:27:48Z Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity Ghebru, Hosaena H. Holden, Stein tenure tenants sharecropping land tenure land ownership agricultural productivity smallholders families While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in explaining why share tenancy contracts are prevalent and diffusing in many developing countries. Using a unique tenant-landlord matched dataset from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how the tenants’ strategic response to the varying economic and tenure-security status of the landlords can explain sharecroppers’ productivity differentials. 2013 2024-10-01T13:56:30Z 2024-10-01T13:56:30Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153518 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Hagos, Hosaena Gebru and Holden, Stein T. 2013. Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1270. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153518 |
| spellingShingle | tenure tenants sharecropping land tenure land ownership agricultural productivity smallholders families Ghebru, Hosaena H. Holden, Stein Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity |
| title | Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity |
| title_full | Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity |
| title_fullStr | Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity |
| title_short | Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity |
| title_sort | reverse share tenancy and marshallian inefficiency landowners bargaining power and sharecroppers productivity |
| topic | tenure tenants sharecropping land tenure land ownership agricultural productivity smallholders families |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153518 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ghebruhosaenah reversesharetenancyandmarshallianinefficiencylandownersbargainingpowerandsharecroppersproductivity AT holdenstein reversesharetenancyandmarshallianinefficiencylandownersbargainingpowerandsharecroppersproductivity |