Collective reputation, social norms, and participation
This paper analyzes a repeated games model of collective reputation with imperfect public monitoring and perfect local peer monitoring of efforts. Even when peer monitoring is local, firms may achieve higher profits under collective reputation by decreasing the cost of maintaining customers' trust....
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| Format: | Journal Article |
| Language: | Inglés |
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Wiley
2012
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153065 |
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