The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China
Based on primary survey data collected over two election cycles in a mountainous area in China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages, this paper examines whether or not elected village heads and appointed Communist party secretaries favor their own natural villages wh...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2011
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/152532 |
| _version_ | 1855516623091269632 |
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| author | Mu, Ren Zhang, Xiaobo |
| author_browse | Mu, Ren Zhang, Xiaobo |
| author_facet | Mu, Ren Zhang, Xiaobo |
| author_sort | Mu, Ren |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Based on primary survey data collected over two election cycles in a mountainous area in China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages, this paper examines whether or not elected village heads and appointed Communist party secretaries favor their own natural villages when distributing public resources. The analysis shows clear evidence of favoritism by both village heads and party secretaries. In a subsequent election, incumbent village heads who have shown strong favoritism are likely to lose, but resource distribution does not seem to affect the likelihood of the reappointment of a party secretary. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace152532 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2011 |
| publishDateRange | 2011 |
| publishDateSort | 2011 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1525322025-11-06T05:22:00Z The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China Mu, Ren Zhang, Xiaobo leaders public goods Based on primary survey data collected over two election cycles in a mountainous area in China, where an administrative village consists of several natural villages, this paper examines whether or not elected village heads and appointed Communist party secretaries favor their own natural villages when distributing public resources. The analysis shows clear evidence of favoritism by both village heads and party secretaries. In a subsequent election, incumbent village heads who have shown strong favoritism are likely to lose, but resource distribution does not seem to affect the likelihood of the reappointment of a party secretary. 2011 2024-10-01T13:54:56Z 2024-10-01T13:54:56Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/152532 en Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Mu, Ren; Zhang, Xiaobo. 2011. The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1061. https://hdl.handle.net/10568/152532 |
| spellingShingle | leaders public goods Mu, Ren Zhang, Xiaobo The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China |
| title | The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China |
| title_full | The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China |
| title_fullStr | The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China |
| title_full_unstemmed | The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China |
| title_short | The role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources: Evidence from a low-income region in China |
| title_sort | role of elected and appointed village leaders in the allocation of public resources evidence from a low income region in china |
| topic | leaders public goods |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/152532 |
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