Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements
This theoretical paper intends to provide an explanation of the implementation of behind-the-border policies, border policies, and of the inefficiency of trade negotiations. We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two identical countries, two commodities, a terms-of-trade...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
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International Food Policy Research Institute
2014
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150501 |
| _version_ | 1855521216700350464 |
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| author | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Martimort, David |
| author_browse | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Martimort, David |
| author_facet | Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Martimort, David |
| author_sort | Bouët, Antoine |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | This theoretical paper intends to provide an explanation of the implementation of behind-the-border policies, border policies, and of the inefficiency of trade negotiations. We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two identical countries, two commodities, a terms-of-trade externality, and a double-tier informational problem. First, domestic producers have private information on their technology. This first layer of asymmetric information affects the design of behind-the-border policies. To reduce the information rent of those producers and ease incentive compatibility constraints, behind-the-border policies must contract domestic supply. Autarky prices are thus modified so that international trade appears. The informationally sensitive sector becomes an import sector and the more so, the greater the political influence of high-cost producers. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace150501 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| publishDateRange | 2014 |
| publishDateSort | 2014 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1505012025-11-06T05:49:26Z Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Martimort, David mathematical models policies markets trade policies trade trade agreements international trade tariffs This theoretical paper intends to provide an explanation of the implementation of behind-the-border policies, border policies, and of the inefficiency of trade negotiations. We consider a general equilibrium model of international trade with two identical countries, two commodities, a terms-of-trade externality, and a double-tier informational problem. First, domestic producers have private information on their technology. This first layer of asymmetric information affects the design of behind-the-border policies. To reduce the information rent of those producers and ease incentive compatibility constraints, behind-the-border policies must contract domestic supply. Autarky prices are thus modified so that international trade appears. The informationally sensitive sector becomes an import sector and the more so, the greater the political influence of high-cost producers. 2014 2024-08-01T02:52:06Z 2024-08-01T02:52:06Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150501 en https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa085 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/162000 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/161920 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/153439 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/160868 https://doi.org/10.2499/0896295109fprev8 IFPRI Discussion Paper Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Bouët, Antoine; Laborde Debucquet, David; Martimort, David. 2014. Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1383. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150501 |
| spellingShingle | mathematical models policies markets trade policies trade trade agreements international trade tariffs Bouët, Antoine Laborde Debucquet, David Martimort, David Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
| title | Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
| title_full | Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
| title_fullStr | Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
| title_full_unstemmed | Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
| title_short | Two-tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade, trade policies, and inefficient trade agreements |
| title_sort | two tier asymmetric information as a motive for trade trade policies and inefficient trade agreements |
| topic | mathematical models policies markets trade policies trade trade agreements international trade tariffs |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150501 |
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