Teams with moral hazard and non-verifiable quality assessment
This paper shows that buying from a team of sellers can be optimal for the buyer in a static model where the buyer has private information about quality, sellers have private information about the cost and choice of effort, and quality is not contractible.
| Autor principal: | |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Elsevier
2015
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150279 |
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