Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry
A central, but inadequately explored issue with respect to subsidized crop insurance programs concerns the costs of delivering insurance coverage to farmers. This study examines that issue in the context of the heavily subsidized US crop insurance program which has often been put forward as a model...
| Autores principales: | , , |
|---|---|
| Formato: | Artículo preliminar |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2016
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148212 |
| _version_ | 1855538607558754304 |
|---|---|
| author | Smith, Vincent H. Glauber, Joseph W. Dismukes, Robert |
| author_browse | Dismukes, Robert Glauber, Joseph W. Smith, Vincent H. |
| author_facet | Smith, Vincent H. Glauber, Joseph W. Dismukes, Robert |
| author_sort | Smith, Vincent H. |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | A central, but inadequately explored issue with respect to subsidized crop insurance programs concerns the costs of delivering insurance coverage to farmers. This study examines that issue in the context of the heavily subsidized US crop insurance program which has often been put forward as a model for agricultural insurance programs in other countries. US Government programs often rely on private firms to deliver income transfers or services, which then establish their own rent-seeking lobbies, which are shared with input suppliers. This rent dispersion process is examined in the context of the U.S. agricultural insurance industry, which receives as much as one third of the annual subsidies that support the federal crop insurance program. We find that as total payments to insurance companies increased between 2001 and 2009, an increasingly large share of the agricultural insurance industry’s rents accrued to insurance agents, although in markets where insurance companies possessed some oligopsony power, agent payments are smaller. The findings also suggest that the insurance industry (companies and independent agents) would almost surely provide the same service for substantially less than the gross revenues from the subsidies and underwriting gains they received. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace148212 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2016 |
| publishDateRange | 2016 |
| publishDateSort | 2016 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1482122025-11-06T07:21:19Z Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry Smith, Vincent H. Glauber, Joseph W. Dismukes, Robert market structure agricultural policies rent crop insurance markets subsidies A central, but inadequately explored issue with respect to subsidized crop insurance programs concerns the costs of delivering insurance coverage to farmers. This study examines that issue in the context of the heavily subsidized US crop insurance program which has often been put forward as a model for agricultural insurance programs in other countries. US Government programs often rely on private firms to deliver income transfers or services, which then establish their own rent-seeking lobbies, which are shared with input suppliers. This rent dispersion process is examined in the context of the U.S. agricultural insurance industry, which receives as much as one third of the annual subsidies that support the federal crop insurance program. We find that as total payments to insurance companies increased between 2001 and 2009, an increasingly large share of the agricultural insurance industry’s rents accrued to insurance agents, although in markets where insurance companies possessed some oligopsony power, agent payments are smaller. The findings also suggest that the insurance industry (companies and independent agents) would almost surely provide the same service for substantially less than the gross revenues from the subsidies and underwriting gains they received. 2016-05-20 2024-06-21T09:24:04Z 2024-06-21T09:24:04Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148212 en https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150960 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148602 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/150463 Open Access application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Smith, Vincent H.; Glauber, Joseph; and Dismukes, Robert. 2016. Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry. IFPRI Discussion Paper 1532. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148212 |
| spellingShingle | market structure agricultural policies rent crop insurance markets subsidies Smith, Vincent H. Glauber, Joseph W. Dismukes, Robert Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry |
| title | Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry |
| title_full | Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry |
| title_fullStr | Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry |
| title_full_unstemmed | Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry |
| title_short | Rent Dispersion in the US Agricultural Insurance Industry |
| title_sort | rent dispersion in the us agricultural insurance industry |
| topic | market structure agricultural policies rent crop insurance markets subsidies |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148212 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT smithvincenth rentdispersionintheusagriculturalinsuranceindustry AT glauberjosephw rentdispersionintheusagriculturalinsuranceindustry AT dismukesrobert rentdispersionintheusagriculturalinsuranceindustry |