Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries?
Since the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, member countries have been heavily relying on the organization's dispute settlement procedure (DSP). Exploiting a new database on WTO litigations between 1995 and 2014, this paper describes disputes initiated over this period and ide...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2017
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147927 |
| _version_ | 1855538069277507584 |
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| author | Bouët, Antoine Metivier, Jeanne |
| author_browse | Bouët, Antoine Metivier, Jeanne |
| author_facet | Bouët, Antoine Metivier, Jeanne |
| author_sort | Bouët, Antoine |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Since the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, member countries have been heavily relying on the organization's dispute settlement procedure (DSP). Exploiting a new database on WTO litigations between 1995 and 2014, this paper describes disputes initiated over this period and identifies potential sources of bias concerning the participation of developing countries. The analysis builds on three different models to determine country i's probability of initiating a dispute against country j. Either it depends only on the two countries' structure of trade, that is the number of products exported by i to j (a situation we refer to as the rules-based model), or it is also affected by country i's or country j's specific characteristics (the unilateral power-based model), or it is also affected by bilateral economic and trade relations between countries i and j (the bilateral power-based model). We find that country i's structure of trade with j plays an important role in explaining the probability that i initiates a dispute against j under the DSP. Furthermore, country i's legal capacity and both countries' political regimes also affect this probability. However, we do not find that bilateral relationships between i and j, such as participants' capacity to retaliate against each others have an impact on dispute initiation. |
| format | Artículo preliminar |
| id | CGSpace147927 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publishDateRange | 2017 |
| publishDateSort | 2017 |
| publisher | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| publisherStr | International Food Policy Research Institute |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1479272025-11-06T07:20:41Z Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? Bouët, Antoine Metivier, Jeanne international agreements trade policies wto trade dispute settlement Since the inception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, member countries have been heavily relying on the organization's dispute settlement procedure (DSP). Exploiting a new database on WTO litigations between 1995 and 2014, this paper describes disputes initiated over this period and identifies potential sources of bias concerning the participation of developing countries. The analysis builds on three different models to determine country i's probability of initiating a dispute against country j. Either it depends only on the two countries' structure of trade, that is the number of products exported by i to j (a situation we refer to as the rules-based model), or it is also affected by country i's or country j's specific characteristics (the unilateral power-based model), or it is also affected by bilateral economic and trade relations between countries i and j (the bilateral power-based model). We find that country i's structure of trade with j plays an important role in explaining the probability that i initiates a dispute against j under the DSP. Furthermore, country i's legal capacity and both countries' political regimes also affect this probability. However, we do not find that bilateral relationships between i and j, such as participants' capacity to retaliate against each others have an impact on dispute initiation. 2017 2024-06-21T09:23:31Z 2024-06-21T09:23:31Z Working Paper https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147927 en https://hdl.handle.net/10568/148421 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/149383 https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147597 https://t20japan.org/policy-brief-reinvigorating-wto-negotiating-forum/ application/pdf International Food Policy Research Institute Bouët, Antoine; Metivier, Jeanne. 2017. Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? IFPRI Discussion Paper 1652. Washington, DC https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147927 |
| spellingShingle | international agreements trade policies wto trade dispute settlement Bouët, Antoine Metivier, Jeanne Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? |
| title | Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? |
| title_full | Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? |
| title_fullStr | Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? |
| title_full_unstemmed | Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? |
| title_short | Is the WTO dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries? |
| title_sort | is the wto dispute settlement procedure fair to developing countries |
| topic | international agreements trade policies wto trade dispute settlement |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147927 |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT bouetantoine isthewtodisputesettlementprocedurefairtodevelopingcountries AT metivierjeanne isthewtodisputesettlementprocedurefairtodevelopingcountries |