Delegation of quality control in value chains
This paper studies the decision of a firm that sells an experience good to delegate quality control to an independent monitor. In an infinitely repeated game consumers’ trust provides incentives to (1) acquire information about whether the good is defective and (2) withhold the good from sale if it...
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| Format: | Artículo preliminar |
| Language: | Inglés |
| Published: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2016
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| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/147431 |
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