The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes
Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervail...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Journal Article |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/145878 |
| _version_ | 1855513449907355648 |
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| author | Gottlieb, Jessica Kosec, Katrina |
| author_browse | Gottlieb, Jessica Kosec, Katrina |
| author_facet | Gottlieb, Jessica Kosec, Katrina |
| author_sort | Gottlieb, Jessica |
| collection | Repository of Agricultural Research Outputs (CGSpace) |
| description | Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas. |
| format | Journal Article |
| id | CGSpace145878 |
| institution | CGIAR Consortium |
| language | Inglés |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publishDateRange | 2019 |
| publishDateSort | 2019 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| publisherStr | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | CGSpace1458782025-12-08T10:06:44Z The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes Gottlieb, Jessica Kosec, Katrina political systems political institutions bargaining power governance legislation Political competition is widely recognized as a mediator of public goods provision through its salutary effect on incumbents’ electoral incentives. We argue that political competition additionally mediates public goods provision by reducing the efficiency of legislative bargaining. These countervailing forces may produce a net negative effect in places with weak parties and low transparency—typical of many young democracies. We provide evidence of a robust negative relationship between political competition and local public goods using panel data from Mali. Tests of mechanisms corroborate our interpretation of this relationship as evidence of legislative bargaining inefficiencies. To explore the generalizability of these findings, we analyze cross-country panel data and show that political competition leads to better (worse) public goods provision under high (low) levels of party system institutionalization. The paper sheds light on why political competition is only selectively beneficial, and underscores the importance of considering both the electoral and legislative arenas. 2019-01-02 2024-06-21T09:05:15Z 2024-06-21T09:05:15Z Journal Article https://hdl.handle.net/10568/145878 en https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhz010 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887120000027 https://doi.org/10.2499/1037800849 Open Access Cambridge University Press Gottlieb, Jessica; and Kosec, Katrina. 2019. The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes. American Political Science Review 113(1): 88-107. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000667 |
| spellingShingle | political systems political institutions bargaining power governance legislation Gottlieb, Jessica Kosec, Katrina The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| title | The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| title_full | The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| title_fullStr | The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| title_full_unstemmed | The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| title_short | The countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision: When bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| title_sort | countervailing effects of competition on public goods provision when bargaining inefficiencies lead to bad outcomes |
| topic | political systems political institutions bargaining power governance legislation |
| url | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/145878 |
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