Intertemporal Choice and Income Regularity: Non-Fungibility in the Timing of Income Among Kenyan Farmers
The optimal design of informal contracts in agricultural value chains depends on when farmers prefer to be paid for their output. While the evidence from the time preference experiments suggests a preference for early payments, ?eld studies often indicate that farmers will defer regular payments if...
| Autores principales: | , |
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| Formato: | Conjunto de datos |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Publicado: |
International Food Policy Research Institute
2021
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/10568/144423 |
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